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This paper investigates the effect of displacement on reemployment wages of socially insured
West German workers who became unemployed in 1986. Because detailed information on the
cause of job loss is unavailable, displacement status is imputed using a probit estimated on the
German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). Average wages of those classified as displaced
decline only slightly upon reemployment. The lowest earnings quartile, in which displacement
is concentrated, even gains slightly (+2%), while wage growth losses for the upper three
quartiles are comparable to US findings (-17%). Large wage losses are associated with
changes of industry, but not of f irm. Our results are robust to controls for heterogeneity, for
recalls, and to the probit specification used, and are confirmed in the smaller GSOEP file.
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A great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the consequences of worker
displacement for individual labor market outcomes. Displacement is usually defined as the
separation of workers from their jobs "without cause" (i.e. for economic reasons) and without
future recall . This type of involuntary rupture in employment relationships is generally
attributed to structural change, sectoral reallocation or technological innovation. In the United
States, displacement is statistically associated with severe and lasting earnings “ losses” on the
order of 10%-25%.
Studying the consequences of worker displacement is important for at least three
reasons. First, it is important to know whether displacement is a serious problem that
policymakers should care about. Second, consequences of worker displacement can help
discriminate among theories of wage determination. Human capital theory relates wage losses
to specificity of previous skill s and training; search and matching theory predicts instead that
employees with long tenure receive high wages because high productivity matches tend to last
longer; contract theories imply that young displaced workers should suffer smaller wage
losses than more seasoned colleagues, whose pay tends to exceed productivity. Third,
macroeconomic theory can be informed by the effects of job displacement on wages and
employment. To the extent that persistent deviations of output from trend are related to
nominal and real wage rigidities, job displacement could represent a mechanism of
macroeconomic adjustment comparable to nominal wage reductions or unanticipated price
level increases. For example, conventional wisdom holds that real wages are rigid in Europe
and flexible in the United States. Although it is often asserted that post-displacement wage
behavior in Europe is different than in the United States, the hypothesis has rarely been
investigated at the microeconomic level.1 The absence of a conclusive literature on
displacement and wages in Europe is largely due to a lack of suitable data. In particular, it is
rarely possible to identify workers explicitly as displaced.
This paper attempts to close this gap. Using a newly available 1% public use panel
sample of the universe of dependent status employed workers, we investigate the effect of
displacement on reemployment wages in Germany, the largest economy of the European
Union. Despite its size and extensive coverage, our dataset has one significant drawback: it
does not contain direct information on reason for separation. To circumvent this problem, we
                                                       
1 See Sachs (1979, 1983), Branson and Rotemberg (1980), and Bruno and Sachs (1985), for the original
references on the implications of aggregate wage rigidity. In a similar spirit, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) have
recently related high European unemployment to the social safety net via its effect on the flexibilit y of
reservation wages, although they only cite evidence from the United States to document their point.
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impute displacement status using information from a smaller, independent, and richer data
source, the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), which includes self-reported information
on the reason for unemployment. Put another way, we use the GSOEP data to estimate a
probit model of job displacement, and then define displacement in the IAB sample as those
workers with a sufficiently high probit value. On the basis of this classfication, we compare
post-reemployment wages of such workers with those who did not experience unemployment
or entered unemployment for other reasons. Using a variety of alternative estimation
procedures – including verification using the GSOEP data -- we attempt to bound potential
effects of misclassification.
Overall , our results point to striking differences in German post-displacement wage
behavior compared with the United States. Our most important finding is that displacement
for the average German worker is not associated with economically significant loss of wage
growth. Full -time men displaced in 1986 and subsequently re-employed in 1987 suffer a
reduction of wage growth of only 3.6% when compared with a reference group of
continuously employed workers. At the same time, post-displacement wage behavior varies
significantly across previous position in the wage distribution. Displaced workers in the upper
three quartiles experience 17% lower average wage growth than comparable non-displaced
workers, while wage growth in the lowest quartile is slightly higher than that of other low
wage workers. Patterns of industrial and occupational mobilit y in the face of displacement are
consistent with losses of industry-specific human capital: the mobilit y rate of displaced
workers is roughly 35% between 1986 and 1987, compared with average mobilit y rates for
nondisplaced full -time workers of only 5%. Consistent with Neal’s (1995) findings for the
US, firm tenure and wages are primarily but not wholly driven by industry-specific factors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief review of the
literature on worker displacement. Section 3 describes the data and gives details on the
estimation and classification procedures. Section 4 presents the basic estimates of the effects
of displacement on wage growth, while Section 5 assesses the robustness of our results in
several directions. In Section 6, the analysis is extended and results are presented on the
persistence of wage losses and the relationship between wage growth, industrial mobilit y and
industry tenure. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
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2. Worker Displacement: A L iterature Review
Research on the effects of worker displacement in the United States has grown dramatically in
recent years (see Hamermesh, 1989; Farber, 1993 and 1997; Hall , 1995; Falli ck, 1996  and
Kletzer, 1998 for surveys). Using a variety of methods and datasets, the findings are
remarkably consistent. First, displaced workers in the US face large and persistent earnings
losses upon reemployment (Podgursky and Swaim, 1987; Hamermesh, 1987; Addison and
Portugal, 1989; Kletzer, 1989, 1991 and 1996; Carrington, 1993; Farber, 1993; Jacobsen et
al., 1993). Point estimates of wage loss in these studies range from 10% to 25%. Ruhm (1987)
reports declines in wage growth of 13.6%; Bartel and Borjas (1981) estimate losses of around
10% for older men. Workers with seniority are less likely to experience displacement, but if
displaced their wage losses are greater (Farber 1993), hinting at a nexus with job tenure.2
Overall , individual characteristics play a smaller role than industry conditions and other
economy-wide factors (Jacobsen et al., 1993). Carrington (1993) argues that much of the
wage losses of high tenure workers are attributable to downturns in their industry, state or
occupation.
Second, in addition to earnings losses, displaced workers in the United States
experience more unemployment than non-displaced workers (Swaim and Podgursky, 1991
and Ruhm, 1991). Hall (1995) links displacement to a period of slow rebuilding of
employment relationships, as workers displaced from long-term jobs require time to find
acceptable matches. Ruhm (1991) shows for the United States that displaced workers face
eight weeks more unemployment than comparable workers in the year of displacement, only
four more weeks the following year and only six days four years later.
In contrast to the impressive consensus on worker displacement in the United States
and Canada, evidence for European labor markets is scant and not always comparable.
Leonard and Audenrode (1995) examine the consequences of job loss for a large sample of
Belgian workers and find that wage losses upon re-employment are near zero. Similarly,
Ackum (1991) finds no significant earnings loss in Sweden. Pichelmann and Riedel (1993)
report wage losses for Austria in the short term only. In Germany, there is littl e if any
comparable work on post-reemployment wages of displaced workers. One related study is
                                                       
2 Although an immediate interpretation of the US evidence is the destruction of f irm-specific human capital
associated with tenure, non-observed individual heterogeneity may bias estimated returns to tenure upwards, so
that previous tenure might have a positive effect on post-displacement wage rates (see Kletzer (1989) for
evidence for the U.S). Another interpretation is simply the destruction of rents associated with good matches,
with no returns to tenure per se, as has been argued by Mincer and Jovanovic (1981), Altonji and Shakotko
(1987), Abraham and Farber (1987), followed by Ruhm (1990) and Altonji and Willi ams (1992). In contrast,
Topel (1991) and Topel and Ward (1992) find substantial returns to seniority. Recently Dustmann and Meghir
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Buttler and Bellmann (1991) who define displaced workers as having left a job in an industry
with employment declines of 30% or more between 1974 and 1986. They identify wage losses
primarily for elder and unskill ed workers. Gerlach and Schasse (1990) use the GSOEP to
show that displaced workers are more likely to experience subsequent unemployment than
quitters and are less capable of transferring human capital across firms.
In both the US and Europe, emphasis in displacement research has shifted from short-
term wage losses to longer-term wage evolution before and after displacement. Ruhm (1991,
1987) estimates wage growth regressions for several years following displacement and
identifies wage losses of 10-13% even four years after the displacement in comparison with
non-displaced workers. Jacobsen et al. (1993) adduce impressive evidence that wages start to
fall approximately four years prior to the displacement, reach a trough at the time of
displacement and rise slowly again afterwards. In contrast, Hamermesh (1987) finds that
wage-tenure-profiles do not flatten as job loss approaches, suggesting that events may take
workers and firms by surprise. Gregory and Jukes (1997) estimate pooled wage level
regressions with dummy variables indicating the end (commencement) of the most recent
unemployment spell "x" quarters before (after) the wage observation, and find that future
unemployment is negatively correlated with current earnings. Leonard and Audenrode (1995)
estimate a significant coeff icient on future job loss in wage level equations on data prior to
displacement. Similar results are presented by Ruhm (1990) for the United States.
3. Identifying Displaced Workers in German Data Sets
Even assuming that agreement is possible on a definition of displacement – for example, high-
tenured workers fired for structural reasons relating to the firm or industry – it is generally
only possible to identify displaced worker directly using self-reported information.
Researchers without access to information on reason for job termination often infer
displacement from previous industry, tenure or employment reductions within an industry or
firm (see Buttler and Bellmann, 1991; Jacobsen et al., 1993; Leonard and Audenrode, 1995;
Mertens, 1997 and 1998; Dustmann et al. 1998). Precisely for this reason, the literature on
worker displacement in Germany is rather limited. In the two data sets used in this study,
either the number of observations is modest (in the German Socioeconomic Panel, hereafter
GSOEP) or reasons for separations are unknown (the IAB social security file). The idea in
this paper is to estimate a probit model for displacement using the more detailed information
available in the GSOEP and use the probit scores to predict involuntary separation in the IAB
                                                                                                                                                                     
(1997) have estimated positive returns to seniority in Germany.
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sample. We therefore define displacement as possessing a vector of attributes which are
suff iciently similar to displaced individuals in the representative GSOEP dataset.3
To achieve approximate correspondence in the two data sets, a number of restrictions
were imposed on the GSOEP data used in estimation. East Germans were omitted for reasons
not only related to the peculiarites of German reunification, but more importantly to their
current absence from the IAB sample. Only full -time workers were considered, because the
IAB data does not include detailed information on hours worked. Workers who were civil ser-
vants or gave up their own businesses were also dropped, since these workers are not included
in the IAB sample. Given the high level of subsidies and "informal employment" in
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, these sectors were excluded, as were individuals working
for non-profit organizations. Workers who just completed an apprenticeship were also
excluded. Most importantly, in the primary analysis we restrict attention to workers who
experienced some unemployment after separation from their old job.4 Table 1 shows that this
restriction is sensible: 46% of all employees who report to have changed their job and experi-
enced some unemployment say that this was due to having been made redundant, compared
with only 8.8% of employees who experienced no intervening unemployment. Later in
Section 5.2., this restriction will be relaxed and the analysis repeated using all j ob movers.
Somewhat surprisingly, 22.9% of the GSOEP sample report quitting as the cause of
unemployment. This seems somewhat high compared with available data from the United
States and the United Kingdom; for example, in the US in 1996 and 1997, 10.7 and 11.8 %
left their jobs into unemployment, respectively (Employment and Earnings 1998).  In contrast,
the overall German quit rate of 39.5% for all workers with some change in their job (including
quits into unemployment) is comparable to these countries.
< Table 1 around here>
We estimate pooled probit equations predicting involuntary separations among
unemployed workers. The dependent variable equals one if the worker reports to have been
laid off , zero otherwise. The most serious problem with this definition of displacement is that
workers fired for cause will be included, yet sample information is not available that would
allow us to distinguish these cases. Our choice of explanatory variables follows Blau and
                                                       
3 See the Appendix for information on the data sets and data selection problems.
4 We define workers as unemployed if 1) they experienced some unemployment after their last employment
spell or 2) they were unemployed at the interview date. A calendar in the GSOEP gives this information on a
monthly basis.
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Kahn (1981). Table 2 displays several specifications. The first two columns include individual
characteristics and previous job tenure as explanatory variables. Displacement is more likely
to have caused unemployment for older workers than for young ones, who often quit into
unemployment. Foreigners are significantly more likely to be displaced than German
nationals, while workers with technical training or university education are less likely to be
laid off . Interaction terms between age and education show that older workers with technical
training are displaced more often and older university graduates less often. As a rule, white
collar workers are laid off less frequently than are blue collar workers. Job tenure is entered as
two dummy variables for tenure up to three years and tenure between three and ten years, so
the control group has ten or more years of tenure. Although the sign on the dummy variables
is positive as expected (less tenure increases the probabilit y of displacement), these
coeff icients are not statistically significant.
The predictive power of these two models can be improved by adding firm size,
sectoral (industry) and time dummy variables for year of displacement (1984-1993). Workers
in small firms are displaced more frequently than in medium-sized ones, although the
coeff icients are only marginally significant at conventional significance levels. The highest
displacement rates are found in construction and the transport/communications sector
followed by other services, manufacturing and trade. Compared with the reference year 1993,
significantly lower displacement rates are found in the years immediately following German
reunification (1990-1992). Our results largely corroborate those reported by Blau and Kahn
(1981), in which age, tenure, industry and business cycle (i.e. calendar time) effects all are
significantly associated with displacement. Adding industry employment growth hardly
changes the results, so the probit from specification IV will be used to predict displacement
status on the sample of all workers in the IAB sample who became unemployed in a single
year, 1986.5 An observation is predicted as displaced if the estimated probabilit y is equal to or
greater than 0.46 (the fraction of displacements in the sample) and not displaced otherwise.
< Table 2 around here>
                                                       
5 In addition to the specifications discussed, we also included female and occupation dummies, but these did not
significantly influence the results and were omitted.
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4. Displacement and Wage Growth in Cross Tabulations and Wage Regressions
4.1. Displacement Incidence
In this section we assess patterns of incidence of unemployment and the wage effects of
involuntary displacement. The analysis focuses on daily wages of full -time workers, as the
IAB data set does not contain direct information on hours worked.6 Of all 146,116 full -time
employees with valid information in the 1986 sample, 6.5% became unemployed at least once
in 1986. For men, the percentage is only slightly higher at 6.8%. Of all full -time workers who
became unemployed in 1986, roughly 80% find either full -or part-time employment by 1990
(83% of all men). Only slightly less, i.e. 78% are re-employed in full -time work (82% of all
men). Figure 1, which displays non-employment survival functions for men and women
becoming unemployed in 1986, documents that most new jobs are found within a year.
< Figure 1 about here>
In the Appendix (Table A1) we report summary statistics on wage growth betweeen
1986 and 1987 in the IAB sample - proxied as log wage differences - for men and women
separately, all employees, and workers classified as displaced using our procedure. Average
wage growth of workers with unemployment who were not displaced is higher than the av-
erage for all employed, and displaced workers fare worse. Women in general and unemployed
women in particular show higher wage growth than men in the first two years following
separation. Subsequent lines of Table A1 document significant male-female differences: men
displaced in 1986 who begin a new full -time job in the same year face wage losses on
average, while displaced women usually have higher wage growth compared with men. One
potential explanation for this finding is that women are more likely than men to have spouse
or partner who can provide financial support for longer search. These striking gender
differences in wage behavior motivated us to focus exclusively on males for the remainder of
the analysis.
 As pointed out above, there are major differences in the incidence of displacement
across industries. For workers becoming unemployed in 1986 and reemployed in 1987,
                                                       
6Foreigners are also excluded, which turns out to be important, given the statistical significance of the foreigner
dummy in the probit estimates. Furthermore, only individuals are included that have valid observations for
covariates used in the probit estimation. One unemployment spell per person is analyzed, so subsequent multiple
unemployment spells are disregarded in the analysis. Because  short-time work is not reported in the IAB
sample, workers in firms with structural problems may work shorter hours before they are displaced, reducing
the daily wage. Consequently, workers earning less than a minimum plausible income of 33 DM/day (around
12,000 DM/year) were excluded from the sample.
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displacement is highest in the construction sector, while no workers were classified displaced
in energy and mining, the state sector and credit and insurance. High displacement in
construction reflects seasonally-related recalls, while low displacement sectors are recognized
as either highly regulated, subsidized, or subject to limited competition. An important and
surprising finding is that a significant number of those classified as displaced in Germany are
"recalled" in all i ndustries, as is frequently the case in the United States.7 With respect to the
1986 sample, 53% of workers classified as displaced later resume work with their employer
prior to the joblessness spell . This finding is not due to our classification procedure, since
46% of all unemployed workers with a spell i n 1986 – irrespective of reason – also return to
their previous employer within the subsequent year.8 These findings are consistent with those
of Mavromaras and Rudolph (1995), who find that on average 12% of all new employment
contracts are recalls in the IAB sample. Despite the existence of short-time working, many
firms apparently use recalls as an employment management tool.
4.2. Wage Growth Regressions
Specification and Other Econometric Issues
It is standard practice to compare the wage growth of displaced workers with that of workers
in stable employment by means of regression analysis, controlli ng for observable individual
and occupational characteristics. First differences in log wage are regressed on a constant,
age, age squared, educational and worker status dummies, as well as other variables including
tenure, tenure squared, and occupation dummies. The coeff icient on a dummy variable for
displacement-classification is included to assess the loss in wage growth of these workers.9 In
theory, nonlinearity of the probit is suff icient to deliver identification, since the displacement
indicator is not simply a linear combination of other regressors. Yet a number of covariates in
the probit are also excluded from the wage growth equation. These include the calendar year
of displacement (representing primarily cyclical factors), age-training interactions, the
foreigner-dummy and industry.10 All of these variables were statistically significant predictors
of displacement status in the GSOEP, and would seem unlikely candidates for contributing to
                                                       
7 See Ehrenberg and Smith (1991:583), Filer, et al.(1998: 354). According to the latter authors, nearly one-third
of all temporary layoffs in the US are recalled within one month of becoming unemployed.
8 We potentially underestimate true recalls, since the basis for our calculations is the employer social security
identifier, which may change when firms merge, divest themselves of subdivisions, reorganize, or otherwise
change identity.
9  See Bartel and Borjas (1981) and Ruhm (1987, 1991) for examples of research which implement this
statistical model.
10 The inclusion of industry dummies did not significantly change estimated coeff icients on other variables.
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the differential dynamics of wages per se (although it is well -established that they are
correlated with wage levels).
Because displacement status is an imputed variable, our estimation procedure is
inevitably subject to measurement error. Some individuals will be predicted as displaced
when not (false positives or Type I error) while others are classified as not displaced when in
fact they are (false negatives or Type II error). If the probit is misspecified, the predominance
of one form of classification error can induce estimation bias: assuming that workers quit for
jobs paying better than the previous ones, Type I error will generally biases wage losses
downwards; prevalence of Type II error biases estimated wage losses upwards. One way to
get around this problem is simply to include the probit score itself as a regressor instead of the
dichotomous displacement state inferred using an arbitrary cutoff point. On the other hand,
even if estimated status itself is unbiased, a two step estimation procedure of the type we use
leads to underestimated standard errors (Murphy and Topel 1985). We thus present the
alternative standard errors in both models using the correction proposed by Murphy and Topel
(1985) in those models that include the probit score itself. Finally, in an alternative procedure
we instrument the imputed displacement state with the probit value. The results of all three
procedures are presented in the following section.
Results
Table 3 presents the estimated coeff icients on the displacement dummies and probit
values in the wage growth regressions of male workers between 1986 and 1987. Detailed
estimation results, excluding recalls, are presented in the Appendix as Table A2. In these
regressions, workers employed 365 days in both years (1986 and 1987) were included as a
control group.11 Specifications i) and ii ) in the first two lines of Table 3 compare the estimated
coeff icient on the displacement dummy when recalled individuals are included and excluded
from the sample. The suspicion that the two samples are fundamentally different is confirmed
by estimation results on the two groups; Chow tests consistently rejected homogeneity of the
two samples (F(22,75777)=236.63). The second line in Table 3 shows that on average displaced
workers have 3.4% lower wage growth than non-displaced workers, excluding recalls.12
<Table 3 about here>
                                                       
11 Very similar estimates are obtained when all other workers who work in both years are also included in the
control group.
12 The percentage change can be calculated by using the formula (ed-1)*100, where d is the parameter estimate
on the dummy variable (see Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980).
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<Figure 2 about here>
The imputation of displacement decreases with wage levels, as Figure 2 shows. It
seemed sensible to estimate separate regressions for male workers in each quartile of the wage
distribution based on initial position in 1986, and the results are presented in the columns of
Table 3. Evidently, displacement has different consequences for low-wage and high-wage
employees. Although more workers are displaced from the low-wage end of the wage
distribution, the coeff icient on displacement is positive and significant for the first quartile.
Workers in the second quartile have 13.5% lower wage growth, in the third quartile 18% and
in the upper quartile 31.6% lower wage growth. It is unlikely that the results are related to
mismeasurement of the displacement variable, since this would presumably bias estimates
towards zero.
Table 3 also presents alternative estimates of displacement wage loss. Besides
including the the dichotomous indicator of predicted displacement as a regressor, we included
instead the value of displacement probit itself as a regressor (specification iii ); alternatively,
the imputed displacement dummy variable was instrumented with the probit value itself
(specification iv). Results obtained using the IV procedure are very close to the OLS
estimates. The last specification (v) reported in Table 3 repeats specification (iii ) with all
reemployed workers who became unemployed in 1986 (without recalls). A similar picture
emerges here too, albeit with smaller wage losses.
5. Robustness Tests: How Good is the Two-Stage Imputation Procedure?
5.1. Sensitivity Analysis of the Displacement Definition
The results reported so far were based on the following rule: all workers with predicted
probabiliti es above 0.46 - the percentage of displaced workers in the sample used to estimate
the probit - count as displaced. In order to test whether the results are sensitive to the cutoff
level, tests were performed using alternatives values of 30%, 40%, 50% and 60%. The results
using 40% and 50% were very close to those at 46% and are not reported. Figure 3 (panel A)
shows what happens to the numerical values of wage losses when the cutoff level varies more
strongly. Estimated wage losses appear positively correlated with the cutoff level, which we
interpret as evidence of important differences between workers with low and high
displacement probabiliti es.
11
<Figure 3 about here>
5.2. Including Displacement without Intervening Unemployment
The probit analyis so far was based on a definition that included only movers with subsequent
intervening unemployment (hereafter "Probit 1"). This definition seemed reasonable because
most workers in the GSOEP who report displacement experience some unemployment, while
only 8% of movers without unemployment report displacement. This definition may,
however, impart a negative bias on the estimated wage losses, because workers who do not
experience unemployment subsequent to displacement would also seem less likely to
experience wage loss in their new jobs. In the following an alternative probit is estimated
using all movers (hereafter "Probit 2").13
Table 4 compares estimated wage losses in the IABS on the basis of both probits again
excluding recalls. From each probit, movers are predicted as displaced when their probabilit y
of being displaced exeeds the proportion of displaced workers in the sample, i.e. 0.46 in
Probit 1 and  0.20 in Probit 2. The Probit 1 classification yields considerably higher wage
losses of, for example, up to around 30% for the upper quartile compared with roughly 8%
using Probit 2. As argued earlier, Probit 1 is likely to overestimate wage losses, if human
capital depreciates during unemployment, if unemployment conveys a negative signal leading
to lower starting wages in new jobs, or if the best workers simply do not pass through
unemployment. Lower wage losses are estimated with Probit 2 because some quits into
unemployment are misclassified as displacement, leading to underestimation of actual loss.
Where reality lies can be assessed using actual sample information in the GSOEP in the
following section.
5.3. Displaced Workers' Wage Growth in the German Socioeconomic Panel
Although the GSOEP provides detailed longitudinal information on displacement status of
unemployed workers, it is impossible to conduct credible mobilit y analyses of displaced
workers due to the limited number of observations.14 This problem arises because much of the
job information in the GSOEP is based on the current job. If the respondent is unemployed at
the time of the interview in a given year, it is impossible to find out any detailed information
on past or future jobs the same year.
In the following we will show what can be inferred from the information in the
                                                       
13 Table A3 in the Appendix compares the two probits for the most preferred specification. Both probits perform
reasonably well i n explaining displacement and are relatively similar, despite some differences in parameter
estimates and significance levels.
14 Only 3144 full -time workers (German and foreign, male and female) with valid information on important
covariates like industry aff ili ation and schooling are identified as movers over a time span of 10 years. Of those
workers under 50% are observed in a full -time job with valid wage observations in two consecutive years.
Focusing on displaced workers, the number decreases further to 183 observations.
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GSOEP. First, we estimated simple year-to-year growth in hourly wages of full -time working
males (German and foreign) for the following groups: stayers, all movers, all displaced
workers, displaced workers with unemployment experience and workers predicted as
displaced by the probit equations. Therefore we had to pool two-year panels (85-86, 86-87
and so forth) into one dataset due to the limited number of observations; results can be found
in Table A4 in the appendix. The consistent message from that experiment is that movers
experience higher wage growth than stayers on average, but displaced workers' pay increases
are only half of stable workers' wage growth. We also used the two different probits to predict
displacement in the GSOEP itself. Recall that Probit 1 is based only on observations of
movers unemployed for at least one month until reemployment and Probit 2 is based on all
movers whether temporarily unemployed or not. While neither of the two probits performs
perfectly, the predicted bias is born out by the empirical results. Probit 1 estimates too few
workers as displaced and seems to underestimate wage growth and hence overestimate wage
loss in comparsion with stable employed workers. However, Probit 2 estimates too many
workers as displaced and overestimates wage growth, hence underestimates wage loss.
Finally, we estimated pooled wage growth regressions, including year dummies that
should control for diverging average wage growth across years. The control group used is
always the same (uninterrupted employment). Table 4 reports the results: the first row reports
estimates for those displaced workers who experience some unemployment. The second row
shows estimates with all displaced workers irrespective of unemployed between jobs and the
last two rows show the estimates using displaced workers predicted from the two different
probits. Dividing the sample into quartiles reduces the number of displaced observations
considerably and displacement dummies are not always significant. Nevertheless, the results
exhibit the same pattern found in the IABS: wage growth losses increase with average wages,
with the best evidence from Probit 2, in which all movers were included. If anything, these
results suggest that the wage growth regression based on Probit 1 overestimate wage losses.
<Table 4 about here>
5.4. Is it merely regression towards the mean?
One interpretation of our results is that wage patterns we infer for workers classified as
displaced simply reflect a regression-to-the-mean phenomenon seen in Galton's Paradox and
related phenomena. In order to consider this hypothesis more directly, we compare directly
the distribution of wage changes for the displaced versus simply unemployed or others.
Kolmogoroff-Smirnoff tests support our contention that our procedure has indeed identified
something in the data which is statistically significant. First, the wage growth distribution of
displaced workers is significantly different from workers without employment change, as can
be seen from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test-statistic including recalls:
KS=7.90812 with a p-value of 0.0001, and excluding recalls: KS=7.27518 with a p-value of
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0.0001. Second, the wage growth distribution of displaced workers also differs significantly
from those of non-displaced unemployed workers, with respective test statistics of
KS=4.34957 and p-value 0.0001 including recalls, and KS=1.719708 and p-value 0.0054
excluding recalls. Moreover, our results showed wage losses not only for the upper two
quartiles, but also for the second quartile. The weight of the evidence does not support the
assertion that post-displacement wage behavior is merely regression to the mean.
5.5. Summary
In sum, we have tested the robustness of our imputation procedure in a number of different
ways. Pattern of wage loss for imputed displacement are robust to the selection procedure,
and evidence from the GSOEP substantiates the findings that wage losses from displacement
are lower on average in Germany than in the United States and that losses increase over the
wage distribution. A range of plausible results for wage losses for the quartiles were estimated
on the basis of two different probits using i) all movers reporting displacement and ii ) those
experiencing unemployment after leaving their old job. The latter method is likely to
overestimate wage losses, since it excludes more successful displaced workers; the former
will t end to misclassify voluntary moves as displacement and overweights those who
erroneously classify themselves as displaced or who were able to anticipate their displacement
well i n advance. Estimates of wage losses for the upper quartile range from 8% using method
i) to roughly 30% for method ii ).
6. Extensions
6.1. Persistence of Post-Displacement Wage Losses
As other research has shown, wage losses associated with displacement need not be
permanent. We thus estimated wage growth from 1986 to years 1987-1990 and are able to
show that wage losses of high wage workers are persistent even four years following the
displacement (this result holds irrespective of whether or not recalls are excluded).15
However, another explanation of our results is that workers differ from the control group by
unobserved characteristics that influence wage growth. Controlli ng for individual
heterogeneity by including absolute frequencies of unemployment spells, while significant,
did not significantly change estimated wage losses.
Individual heterogeneity may have been responsible for wage growth prior to 1986 as
well (see Jacobsen et al. 1993 for the United States). Column 1 of Table 5 reports estimates of
wage growth regressions for 1985 to 1986; they show that workers on average do in fact have
                                                       
15 See Table A5 in the Appendix.
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lower wage growth before displacement, but the estimated effect of the displacement dummy
is much smaller pre-displacement than post-displacement: -10% for the upper quartile and
-1% for the lowest quartile. Including the number of previously observed unemployment
spells in these regressions does not significantly alter the results. Evidently, displaced workers
not only face lower wage growth than continuously employed workers following
displacement, but also slightly lower wage growth before separation.
<Table 5 about here>
6.2. Wage Growth, Industr ial Mobili ty and Industry Tenure
Table 3 showed that wage losses for the upper three quartiles are lower for workers classified
as displaced but subsequently reemployed by their previous employer (recalled). One possible
explanation for this are returns to firm specific human capital, which are presumably
recoverable upon recall . We included an interaction between imputed displacement and the
incidence of recall , as well as one between imputed displacement with industry switching.
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that recalled workers in the upper three quartiles
indeed have higher wages than reemployed workers who are not recalled to their old firm.
Moreover, from 1988 onwards, industry movers generally have lower wage growth than
stayers even in the first wage quartile. This result can be seen as evidence for industry-
specific human capital or industry rents lost when switching industries. It appears that
workers who switch between industries in Germany are most often forced to do so and suffer
wage losses as a consequence. For the upper three quartiles, this is confirmed by a robust
negative estimate of 7.4-9.8 log points for displaced industry switchers and a positive estimate
as high as 24.8 log points for recalls.
If job tenure contributes to the accumulation of specific human capital, higher tenure
should be correlated with larger wage losses. If , however, wage gains are due to industry-
specific capital, then displacement should only affect future wage growth when workers
switch industries. When both recalls and workers with less than one year of tenure are
excluded from the displacement group, the number of workers with imputed displacement
declines to 604; evidently this phenomenon is rare in western Germany, with unstable
employment relationships concentrated in a small segment of the labor market.16 The last
column in Table 5 reports results for regressions with interaction terms between displacement
dummy and both previous industry tenure as well as firm tenure. Wage losses increase with
15
industry tenure when looking at the average of all workers, but this effect is less uniform from
the perspective of individual quartiles. Even more surprising is the fact that previous firm
tenure seems to increase wage rates of displaced workers. At the same time, the recall
interaction becomes negative for the first quartile. If recalled workers have higher previous
tenure, this interaction might simply pick up some of the recall effects. Firm tenure
interactions remain significant, however, even if recalled workers are excluded. Other
interpretations of this effect can only be speculative, but matching and search theory gives
good reason to expect a positive correlation between firm tenure and productivity. Hence, if
high productivity workers accrued longer tenures on their old jobs and found better matches
when reemployed, then a positive interaction might be expected. Learning about the complex
relationships between tenure, wages, and productivity from the rich working histories of
displaced workers will be left to future research.
7. Conclusion
Our most important findings can be grouped into two categories: first, those concerning
observable factors associated with displacement, and second, the consequences of
displacement for reemployment earnings. With regards to the former, we largely confirm
results reported by Blau and Kahn (1981), in which age, tenure, industry and business cycle
factors are significantly associated with displacement. Displacement is also higher in
construction, trade, manufacturing and services, which is also consistent with US evidence.
On the other hand, displacement is particularly low in the most regulated industries in Ger-
many, energy, mining and the state sector, but also in credit and insurance.
A central finding is that German workers displaced in 1986 experienced significantly
lower wage growth loss upon reemployment than estimated in the United States. At the same
time, sample stratification reveals distinct differences for low and high wage workers: while
wage growth for displaced workers in the lowest quartile in comparison with other low wage
workers is marginally higher, high wage workers in the upper three quartiles exhibit losses of
around 17% on average. While the latter figure is comparable to the wage losses estimated in
the US, displacement occurs primarily in the lower segment of the wage distribution. This
finding is certainly related to the evolution of measured wage inequality, which is low in
Germany (Davis 1992) and is likely related to institutional factors described in Blau and Kahn
(1996).17 Moreover, our tentative results on longer term wage growth point, li ke findings in
                                                                                                                                                                     
16 Wage growth regressions yield very similar results to the ones above and are not reported.
17 Along similar lines, Kuhn and Sweetman (1998) report that displaced workers losing union status experience
higher wage losses than those who do not.
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the US, to "scarring" with respect to wages, suggesting that some aspects of the employment
relationship are permanently destroyed in the displacement process.
Could it really be the case that fewer are displaced in Germany and have lower wage
losses? This apparent “win-win” impression is deceptive, especially when one considers
reemployment probabiliti es for those who are long-term unemployed after displacement.18 As
only around 80% of all displaced workers are observed in socially insured employment even
four years following the displacement, it seems more likely that Germans have achieved
lower wage losses upon displacement at the cost of lower reemployment probabiliti es, raising
once again the issue of the distribution of the burden of unemployment and adjustment. In this
sense, the hypothesis put forward by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) seems to receive support
at the microeconometric level.
Noteworthy is also our finding of high industrial and occupational mobilit y rates
among displaced workers in Germany of around 33%. Average overall mobilit y rates are
much lower in the sample at around 6%. Displaced workers seem to carry the burden of
adjustment - incentives to move do not appear to be particularly strong so that workers only
move when they are forced to by displacement. Mobilit y rates decrease with firm tenure, but
not so much with potential labor market experience. As firm tenure is highly correlated with
both industrial and occupational tenure, this finding is consistent with the accumulation of
specific capital.
Displaced workers exhibit a pattern of lower wage growth than the average
unemployed worker, regardless of whether two groups are stratified by education, tenure or
potential experience. Particularly, post-displacement wage growth for workers with high
potential labor market experience is lower than that for all unemployed workers with the same
level of experience. These clear differences between all unemployed and displaced workers,
combined with the finding of wage growth losses for high wage workers which resemble
those in the US, lends support to the plausibilit y of our means of distinguishing between the
two groups.
                                                       
18 We are grateful to Christopher Ruhm for pointing this out to us.
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Tables





Percent of total workers (n=2185) (n=959)
  Made redundant  8.8 % 45.9 %
  Fixed term contract ended  3.7 % 10.4 %.
  Quit 44.3 % 22.9 %
  Mutually agreed termination of
     employment1
 2.9 %  4.6 %
  Other 40.3 % 16.2 %
Note: The sample includes all employees who report a job change with known type of change. Workers
reporting to have been civil servants, self-employed or apprentices were excluded, as were those with missing
values for variables used in the probit analysis below and private households, non-profit organizations and
agriculture (including forestry and fisheries). Source: Own calculations from the GSOEP.
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Table 2 - Displacement Probits in the GSOEP for Full -Time Workers (1985-1994)+
I1 II 1 III 1 IV1 V1
Constant -0.2621 -0.2575 -1.0993** -0.8794* -0.7732+
(0.2759) (0.2843) (0.3941) (0.4139) (0.4258)
Age 0.0018 0.0013 0.0015 0.0018 0.0019
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057)
Age * technical training 0.0141* 0.0142* 0.0138* 0.0155** 0.0156*
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0071)
Age * university -0.0086 -0.0074 -0.0121 -0.0188 -0.0201
(0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0260) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Foreigner 0.2239* 0.2388* 0.2469* 0.3027** 0.3015*
(0.0974) (0.0979) (0.0993) (0.1019) (0.1019)
Technical training -0.6112* -0.6208* -0.6417* -0.7219** -0.7235**
(0.2619) (0.2625) (0.2661) (0.2708) (0.2709)
University -0.0731 -0.0574 0.1736 0.3249 0.3736
(0.9680) (0.9741) (0.9741) (1.0013) (1.0032)
Blue collar with  techn. training 0.0539 0.0236 -0.0286 -0.0218 -0.0135
(0.1172) (0.1181) (0.1225) (0.1252) (0.1255)
Foremen, master 0.0794 0.0272 0.0166 0.1352 0.1555
(0.4595) (0.4654) (0.4731) (0.4757) (0.4757)
White Collar -0.2642* -0.2897* -0.2011 -0.1932 -0.1981
(0.1189) (0.1201) (0.1299) (0.1319) (0.1321)
Job duration 0-3 years 0.1687 0.1315 0.1387 0.2212 0.2218
(0.1380) (0.1396) (0.1428) (0.1457) (0.1458)
Job duration 3-10 years 0.1836 0.1621 0.1836 0.2106 0.2151
(0.1301) (0.1310) (0.1330) (0.1352) (0.1354)
Small firm 0.2085* 0.1809+ 0.1685 0.1677
(0.1034) (0.1067) (0.1104) (0.1104)
Large firm -0.0547 0.0334 -0.0142 -0.0078
(0.1020) (0.1060) (0.1085) (0.1087)
Manufactur ing 0.7636** 0.7837** 0.8164**
(0.2680) (0.2735) (0.2767)
Construction 1.1463** 1.1274** 1.1631**
(0.2886) (0.2951) (0.2986)
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Table 2 continued I1 II 1 III 1 IV1 V1
Trade . . 0.7518* 0.7468* 0.7257*
(0.2948) (0.2999) (0.3019)
Transpor t, communication . . 1.0873** 1.0947** 1.0832**
(0.3379) (0.3460) (0.3477)
Credit, insurance . . -0.3831 -0.3219 -0.3492
(0.5922) (0.6116) (0.6133)
Other services . . 0.8043* 0.8150* 0.7169*
(0.2808) (0.2856) (0.2999)
Displacement 84 . . . -0.1803 -0.3052
(0.1563) (0.1929)
Displacement 85 . . . -0.0451 -0.1702
(0.1764) (0.2090)
Displacement 86 . . . -0.1599 -0.3169
(0.1817) (0.2304)
Displacement 87 . . . -0.1985 -0.3349
(0.1773) (0.2158)
Displacement 88 . . . -0.1178 -0.2614
(0.2025) (0.2404)
Displacement 89 . . . -0.3512+ -0.5224*
(0.1902) (0.2449)
Displacement 90 . . . -0.8366** -1.0814**
(0.1917) (0.2922)
Displacement 91 . . . -0.7166** -0.9238**
(0.1811) (0.2602)
Displacement 92 . . . -0.5146** -0.6373**
(0.1831) (0.2141)
Industry employment growth . . . . 3.2005
(2.8699)
Pseudo-R2 6.9 8.0 13.2 18.8 19.1
Note: 1= Dependent variable equals one if the mover has been made redundant and zero otherwise. Selection: all
movers without workers having just completed their apprenticeship, formerly self-employed or former civil
servants. Without agriculture, forestry, fisheries, private households and non-profit organizations. Previously
full -time employed West Germans only. A ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level and +  at
the 10% level. The reference groups are blue collar workers without technical training in the state or
energy/mining sector with more than 10 years of tenure displaced in 1993 from a medium sized firm. Source:
Own calculations based on the GSOEP.
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Table 3 - Estimated Coeff icient on Displacement Dummy in Equations Predicting Wage
Growth in 1986-1987
Sample
Specification All workers 1st Quar tile 2nd Quar tile 3rd Quartile 4th Quar tile


















































Note: Wage growth regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample (except otherwise stated): Workers
estimated as displaced by a high enough probit score and control group of workers who work 365 days each year
1986 and 1987. Number of observations without recalls 74,302 (of which 1,356 displaced).  Number of
observations with recalls 75,821 (of which 2875 displaced). ** indicates significance at the 1%-level. Other
control variables are: age, age2, previous firm tenure, previous firm tenure2, education dummies, worker status
dummies, firm size dummies and occupation dummies.
a = OLS: Dummy that equals 1 if worker is estimated as displaced.
b = OLS: Estimated probabilit y for displaced workers is included directly. Murphy/Topel (1985) corrected
standard errors are reported.
c = IV: Displacement is instrumented with the estimated probabilit y.
d = OLS: All unemployed workers and their estimated probabilit y for displacement are included.
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Table 4 –Wage Growth Regressions in the GSOEP by Quartile
Sample
All workers 1st Quar tile 2nd Quar tile 3rd Quar tile 4th Quar tile
Displaced workers with some
unemployment experience -0.0328 -0.0085 -0.0872 -0.084 -0.1605
 Standard error (0.044) (0.065) (0.067) (0.081) (0.207)
 Observations (of which  displaced) 20461 (78) 5104 (42) 5128 (20) 5188 (10) 5044 (6)
All displaced workers -0.0468+ 0.0517 -0.0720+ -0.1135* -0.2618*
 Standard error (0.031) (0.041) (0.049) (0.048) (0.110)
 Observations (of which  displaced) 20544 (161) 5134 (72) 5146 (38) 5057 5207 (21)
Predicted displaced – Probit1 -0.0534 -0.073 -0.0571 -0.4641** -0.0294
 Standard error (0.056) (0.069) (0.095) (0.086) (0.253)
 Observations (of which  displaced) 20431 (48) 5087 (25) 5119 (10) 5186 (9) 5039 (4)
Predicted displaced – Probit2 0.0062 0.0980** -0.0427 -0.0685* -0.3354**
 Standard error (0.025) (0.032) (0.037) (0.049) (0.104)
 Observations (of which  displaced) 20632 (249) 5161 (126) 5155 (69) 5106 (30) 5210 (249)
Note: Estimated coeff icients on displacement dummies in wage growth regressions. Included are workers
reported as displaced or estimated as displaced by the procedure described in the text and reemployed in the
following year. The control group consists of workers who are continuously employed. Parameter estimates in
Probit 1 are based on only those job movers who experience some unemployment. Probit 2 is based on all j ob
movers. Other control variables: age, age2, gender dummy, foreigner dummy, education dummies, firm size
dummies, tenure ≤ 1 year dummy, year dummies, ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level and
+ 
 at the 10% level.
Source: Own calculations using the GSOEP from 1985 to 1994.
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Table 5 – Wage Growth, Recall and Industry Movers
1985-1986 1986-1987 1986-1987
All workers
displaced -0.0220** -0.0231** -0.0225**
displaced * industry move . -0.0242** -0.0268**
displaced * recall . 0.0051 -0.0033
displaced * industry tenure . . -0.0034**
displaced * firm tenure . . 0.0065**
1st Quar tile -0.0095*
displaced . 0.0250** 0.0070
displaced * industry move . -0.0074 -0.0050
displaced * recall . -0.0097 -0.0287**
displaced * industry tenure . . -0.0012
displaced * firm tenure . . 0.0112**
2nd Quar tile
displaced -0.0348** -0.0929** -0.1206**
displaced * industry move . -0.0981** -0.0909**
displaced * recall . 0.0725** 0.0598**
displaced * industry tenure . . 0.0046**
displaced * firm tenure . . 0.0023
3rd Quar tile
displaced -0.0614** -0.1637** -0.1625**
displaced * industry move . -0.0816** -0.0867**
displaced * recall . 0.0968** 0.0808**
displaced * industry tenure . . -0.0056**
displaced * firm tenure . . 0.0100**
4th Quar tile
displaced -0.1103** -0.3448** -0.3522**
displaced * industry move . -0.0740** -0.0732**
displaced * recall . 0.2488** 0.2416**
displaced * industry tenure . . -0.0015
displaced * firm tenure . . 0.0052**
Note: Dependent variable is the log wage differential. ** indicates significance at the 1%-level and * at the 5%-
level (one-sided test). Included are workers displaced in 1986 and employed in the year for which wage growth
is calculated. The control group consists of workers who work 365 days each year during the time span of the
respective wage growth regression. Other control variables are: age, age2, previous firm tenure, previous firm
tenure2, education dummies, worker status dummies, firm size dummies and occupation dummies. Source: Own
calculations based on the IAB-sample.
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Figures
Figure 1 - Non-Employment Survivor Function
Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
UDUR








Note: UDUR=duration of non-employment spell following displacement or other transition into unemployment.
The survivor function is defined as the probabilit y that non-employment duration will be equal to or exeed a
specific amount of days. Censoring point: 1825 days.
Source: Own calculations using the IAB Sample.
































































Note: Displaced workers are estimated from probit equations using the GSOEP. The graph shows displacement
frequencies in different daily wage groups: displaced workers with daily wage "x" / all employees with daily
wage "x".  See text for details.
Source: Own calculations based on the IAB sample.
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Note: In panel A the cutoff f or predicted displacement is varied. In Panel B the Probit 1 is based on only those
job movers who experience some unemployment. Probit 2 is based on all j ob movers. See the text for details.
Source: Own calculations using the IAB sample.
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Data Appendix
I . The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP)
The GSOEP is a panel of approximately 3600 West German households which has been
conducted annually since 1984. All adults in participating households are interviewed once a
year, usually in spring. The questions cover economic and social conditions of all household
members. Of particular interest to this study is the fact that currently employed workers with
changes in their job during the last year and workers who became unemployed during the
previous year are asked about the nature of the job change or loss. When workers state that
there was a change, they are then asked "How did your last spell of employment end?"
Answers include layoff , end of f ixed term contract, quit and mutual agreed termination of
employment.19
For workers who changed jobs, the GSOEP contains retrospective information on the
worker's previous employment relationship such as firm size, industry and occupation. The
extraction of retrospective data is not trivial, and depends on when the interview took place
and when the job is reported to have ended. The bulk of the interviews occur in the spring, but
some interviews are held in almost every month of the year. Most questions we are interested
in refer to the time of the interview like the industry or occupation of employed workers.
Previous job information is only available for those workers who were employed at the last
round of the interviews. Some of the unemployed workers became unemployed before that
date and some currently employed workers might have been unemployed one year before, so
workers must sometimes be traced back several waves.
For our purposes four cases can be distinguished: workers who are unemployed in the
year of the interview t and employed in t-1 (UtEt-1); workers unemployed in both years t and t-
1 (UtUt-1); workers employed in t and t-1 (EtEt-1); and workers employed in t but unemployed
in t-1 (EtUt-1). Workers who were unemployed at the time of the interview in t-1, i.e. groups
(UtUt-1) and (EtUt-1), must have lost their job before the interview that year. It is impossible
that the job loss occurred in year t-2, as the original question asks for job changes only within
year t-1 up until to the interview date in t. For those workers, job information from year t-2 is
taken if available. For several reasons, information may be missing. The individual might not
have been in the labor force at the interview time, she might have been unemployed and found
a job later in year t-2, or she might have not participated in that wave. Multiple job changes
may pose a problem if movers were unemployed at the time of the interview in t-1, then found
                                                       
19 In fact workers are asked, for example in March, whether their job changed since the beginning of the
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a job and lost it again before the interview in time t. It is impossible to obtain information on
the characteristics of that job and therefore we have to neglect multiple job changes.
For group (UtEt-1) retrospective information from time t-1 is taken, as it is for group
(EtEt-1). Using information on the year and month of the reported job ending and on the time
of the interview, it can be verified, whether this information is correct: if the job is reported to
end before the interview in t-1, then information on separation cannot be linked to the job in t,
but to the one in t-2! Also in these cases job information for t-2 is taken, if available. Further
waves are not checked, as the likelihood of using the wrong job information due to multiple
job changes increases.
II . The German Social Secur ity File (IAB)
The second data set we employ is a large random sample drawn from the universe of west
German social security records starting in 1973, when an integrated reporting procedure for
unemployment, health insurance and pensions was introduced.20 Firms are required to report
on all dependent employees paying social security contributions, including information on
income, education, exact number of days worked, occupation, industry, worker status,
nationality and marital status. Employers report on the initiation and termination of jobs as
well as on all ongoing employment relationships at least once a year on December 31. The
1%-sample contains precise daily information on approximately 430,000 employees. Not
included are civil servants, self-employed and workers earning wages below the compulsory
social security threshold. The sample also contains information on receipt of unemployment
benefit and income while participating in retraining programs. Hence, the individuals can be
followed through non-employment spells as long as they are eligible for benefits paid by the
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. While the IAB panel has been increasingly recognized as a powerful
instrument for labor market research, its structure and information content differ significantly
from the GSOEP. Notwithstanding these differences, information from the two data sets can
be made comparable for our purposes.
There are a number of noteworthy limitations of the IAB data set. First, it excludes
self-employment as well as casual employment which falls under the minimum
(Geringfügigkeitsgrenze, DM 620 per month in 1998) and thereby is exempt from social
security contributions. Second, wages and salaries are censored above the maximum ceili ng
on which social security contributions must be paid. The cutoff- levels
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) for the time span used in this paper rose from 4,700 DM per
                                                                                                                                                                     
previous calendar year. Up until 1990 a second question was also asked: "Why did your last job end?"
20 For further descriptions of the data set see Rohwer (1995) and Bender and Hilzendegen (1995).
30
month in 1982 to 6,300 DM in 1990, but only under 10% of observations are usually at the
cutoff level. These observations were deleted in our estimations. Third, privacy safeguards
preclude the availabilit y of regional information apart from a very crude measure of
population density. Fourth, information on hours worked is unavailable. Finally, information
on education is more aggregated and the individual information more limited than in other
micro data sets such as the GSOEP
The IAB data identify moves of workers with day-to-day accuracy. Several types of
moves exist and can be distinguished: (a) direct move from job to job, (b) move from job to
job with an intervening spell without information about the worker, (c) between jobs with
intervening spell of unemployment. If a workers moves from job to non- or unemployment
without any further information he might have become self-employed or retired, dropped out
of the labor force or died. In this paper, we are primarily interested in finding out the
economic consequences for workers of group (c) who were involuntarily displaced. Group (b)
is too heterogeneous to be considered: military service, children, unemployment without
eligibilit y for benefits or any other voluntary break can be responsible.  Certainly, there might
be some workers in group (a) as well , who lost their job involuntarily, were notified in
advance and managed to find a new job before they became unemployed, however, most of
the job-to-job moves were not due to displacement. As can be seen from Table 1, the
percentage of workers made redundant for those with some unemployment is 46%, the
percentage of workers made redundant for those without any unemployment is only 8.8%.
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III . Employing the Two Data Sets
Because information on personal characteristics in the IAB sample is limited, personal
covariates are defined broadly to include three different education levels (no technical
training, technical training, university degree), job status in four categories (blue collar
without training, blue collar with training, master/foremen, white collar), year of birth, and
marital status. The breakdown of job specific characteristics like occupation and industry is
limited by the small numbers of observations we have in the GSOEP. Because many smaller
cells are otherwise empty, we were forced to use information at the one-digit level. Firm size
categories are not completely conformable and are therefore placed in three broad categories:
small (1-19), medium (20-99 in the IAB sample and 20-199 in the GSOEP) and large (100
and above or 200 and above respectively).
The IAB sample does contain information on hours worked, but only the full -
time/part-time distinction, so only full -time workers are included in the analysis. As described
above in Section 2.1 the question "How did your previous job end?" in the GSOEP refers pri-
marily to the year prior to the survey, so information is reported for displaced workers for not
only a point in time, but over a time period. Consequently, we also look at those workers who
become unemployed within a single year in the IAB sample, 1986.
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Appendix-Tables
Table A1 - Average Wage Growth by Sex
Men Women Men and Women
All employees1,2 1986 - 1987 0.042 0.059 0.047
  Standard deviation (0.122) (0.128) (0.124)
  Observations 89,614 40,770 130,384
Non-displaced workers with 1986 - 1987 0.632 0.086 0.071
unemployment beginning 19861,2   Standard deviation (0.256) (0.261) (0.264)
  Observations 1,572 876 2448
Workers displaced 19861,2 1986 - 1987 0.027 0.053 0.030
  Standard deviation (0.242) (0.278) (0.248)
  Observations 2,875 457 3,332
Non-displaced workers with First new job 1986 0.042 0.050 0.045
unemployment beginning 19863   Standard deviation (0.277) (0.249) (0.267)
  Observations 958 551 1509
First new job 1987 0.051 0.062 0.055
  Standard deviation (0.261) (0.286) (0.271)
  Observations 761 433 1194
Workers displaced 19863 First new job 1986 -0.015 0.042 -0.008
  Standard deviation (0.252) (0.291) (0.258)
  Observations 1,738 253 1,991
First new job 1987 0.026 0.032 0.027
  Standard deviation (0.225) (0.275) (0.236)
  Observations 1,345 280 1,634
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. In the calculations only full -time employees before and after the
change were included. From reported full -time employment those workers are deleted, who earn less
than 12,000 DM per year. See text for details of the problem and further selections.
1 For workers not displaced wage growth between the first job in 1986 and the first job in 1987 is
calculated.
2 For workers becoming unemployed or displaced wage growth between the pre-unemployment job in
1986 and the first job in 1987 is calculated.
3 Wage growth between pre-unemployment job and the first full -time job after unemployment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IAB sample.
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Table A2 - Wage Growth Regressions for High and Low Wage Workers Excluding Recalls
Sample
All workers 1. Quar tile 2. Quar tile 3. Quar tile 4. Quar tile
Constant 0.3121** 0.4033** 0.0580** 0.0666** 0.0275**
(0.0052) (0.0129) (0.0087) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Displaced -0.0364** 0.0187** -0.1450** -0.2013** -0.3791**
(0.0027) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0063) (0.0077)
Age -0.0118** -0.0166** -0.0005 -0.0019** -0.0009*
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Age2 * 10-2 0.0123** 0.0186** 0.0001 0.0010* 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Tech. training -0.0005 0.0072** 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0026
(0.0011) (0.0028) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0020)
University -0.0106** 0.0710** 0.0445** 0.0265** -0.0027
(0.0017) (0.0144) (0.0059) (0.0035) (0.0021)
Blue collar with  training 0.0052** 0.0146** 0.0077** 0.0091** 0.0087**
(0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0032)
Foremen, master 0.0124** 0.0443** 0.0304** 0.0313** 0.0305**
(0.0020) (0.0100) (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0032)
White Collar 0.0119** 0.0318** 0.0192** 0.0284** 0.0285**
(0.0013) (0.0039) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0031)
Small firm -0.0052** -0.0124** -0.0094** -0.0033 -0.0087**
(0.0011) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0016)
Large firm 0.0002 0.0104** 0.0058** 0.0067** 0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0010)
Previous tenure -0.0055** -0.0087** -0.0025** -0.0003 -0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Previous tenure2 * 10-2 0.0323** 0.0468** 0.0122** 0.0018 0.0073*
(0.0030) (0.0085) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0035)
Adj . R² 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.15
Observations total 74,302 18,501 18,206 18,849 18,746
   " classified as displaced 1,356 939 230 140 47
Note: Nine occupation dummies are included and not reported. Inclusion of higher digit
dummies did not change the results. Reference group: no technical training, blue collar,
technical occupation. ** indicates significance at the 1%-level and * at the 5%-level (one-
sided test). Source: Authors’ calculations using the IAB sample.
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Table A3 - A Comparison of Two Probits
Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 1 Probit 2
Pseudo-R2 18.8 25.1
Observations 959 3114
Constant -0.8794* -1.3161** Construction 1.1274** 0.7596**
(0.4139) (0.2655) (0.2951) (0.1807)
Age 0.0018 0.0059 Trade 0.7468* 0.4946**
(0.0057) (0.0039) (0.2999) (0.1832)
Age * technical training 0.0155** 0.0129** Transpor t,
communication
1.0947** 0.3093
(0.0071) (0.0046) (0.3460) (0.2129)
Age * university -0.0188 0.0236 Credit, insurance -0.3219 -0.3257
(0.0267) (0.0143) (0.6116) (0.3481)
Foreigner 0.3027** 0.3746** Other services 0.8150* 0.4972**
(0.1019) (0.0672) (0.2856) (0.1758)
Technical training -0.7219** -0.6589** Displacement 84 -0.1803 0.0854
(0.2708) (0.1733) (0.1563) (0.1089)
University 0.3249 -1.3766* Displacement 85 -0.0451 -0.0307
(1.0013) (0.5430) (0.1764) (0.1152)
Blue collar with  techn. training -0.0218 -0.1661* Displacement 86 -0.1599 -0.2673*
(0.1252) (0.0797) (0.1817) (0.1178)
Foremen, master 0.1352 -0.4684 Displacement 87 -0.1985 -0.2153
(0.4757) (0.2959) (0.1773) (0.1203)
White collar -0.1932 -0.3307** Displacement 88 -0.1178 -0.2468*
(0.1319) (0.0843) (0.2025) (0.1252)
Job duration 0-3 years 0.2212 0.3967** Displacement 89 -0.3512+ -0.4910**
(0.1457) (0.0946) (0.1902) (0.1205)
Job duration 3-10 years 0.2106 0.2512** Displacement 90 -0.8366** -0.6555**
(0.1352) (0.0890) (0.1917) (0.1228)
Small firm 0.1685 0.1618* Displacement 91 -0.7166** -0.6038**
(0.1104) (0.0712) (0.1811) (0.1196)
Large firm -0.0142 -0.2118** Displacement 92 -0.5146** -0.4231**
(0.1085) (0.0693) (0.1831) (0.1202)
Manufactur ing 0.7837** 0.5106**
(0.2735) (0.1663)
Note: Dependent variable equals one if the mover has been made redundant and zero otherwise. Probit 1: only
movers with unemployment experience. Probit 2: all movers. Further selections: see text. ** indicates signifi-
cance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level and +  at the 10% level. The reference groups are blue collar workers
without technical training in the state or energy/mining sector with more than 10 years of tenure displaced in
1993 from a medium sized firm. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the GSOEP.
35
Table A4 - Two-Year Growth in Hourly Wages in the GSOEP
Observations Mean wage growth Standard Deviation
Stable full -time workers 15121 0.0370 0.3912
All displaced workers 125 0.0002 0.3337




Predicted displaced workers -
Probit 1
39 -0.1166 0.5168
Predicted displaced workers -
Probit 2
225 0.0277 0.5280
Note: Pooled two year samples between 1985 and 1994. Probit 1 is based on workers who experience an
unemployment spell . Probit 2 is based on all movers whether they experience unemployment or not.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the GSOEP. See text for details.
Table A5 - Long Run Wage Losses of Male Workers
Sample



















































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 1%-level and * at
the 5%-level (one-sided test). Included are workers displaced in 1986 and employed in
the year for which wage growth is calculated. The control group consists of workers
who work 365 days each year during the time span of the respective wage growth
regression. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IAB-sample.
